79 Condorcet (Voting-Cycle) Paradox
Three citizens rank policies A, B, C such that majority prefers A > B, B > C, and C > A, creating a cycle with no clear winner. Individual rankings are rational; the collective ranking is not. The paradox proves that simple majority voting can violate transitivity, foreshadowing complexities in committee and legislative agendas. Run-off rules, agenda control, or Condorcet-consistent methods (Ranked-Pairs, Schulze) attempt to tame cycles.
80 Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
Kenneth Arrow formalised fairness axioms for aggregating individual rankings into a social order (non-dictatorship, Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, unrestricted domain). For three or more options, no system satisfies them all simultaneously. The “impossibility” is less a dead-end than a design map: every voting rule trades off at least one desirable property, and choosing a method entails explicit value judgements.
81 Ostrogorski Paradox
A voter might favour Party X on policy areas 1 and 2 and favour Party Y on area 3, yet if area 3 is most salient, she votes Y. Aggregated at scale, the election outcome can deliver a party whose stance is minority‐preferred on every issue. The paradox demonstrates that single-dimensional ballots compress multi-dimensional preferences, encouraging proposals like issue-by-issue referenda or proportional representation.
82 Downs (Voting-Turnout) Paradox
The expected benefit of voting equals probability of pivotality times the policy gain—minuscule in national elections—while costs (time, travel) are tangible. Rational agents therefore shouldn’t vote, yet many do. Solutions invoke expressive benefits, civic duty, or very small but non-zero pivotal probabilities under uncertainty. The paradox anchors empirical work on turnout incentives and ballot design.
83 Plurality-Winner Paradox
With three candidates, A may beat B and C by pluralities even though a majority prefers either B or C to A in head-to-head matches. Spoiler effects (third-party candidates) and vote splitting cause such non-majoritarian winners. Ranked-choice voting, approval voting, or two-round systems are reform attempts to ensure broader consent.
84 Paradox of Tolerance
Unlimited tolerance, argued Karl Popper, permits intolerant movements to grow and ultimately destroy tolerance itself. A liberal society may therefore defend egalitarian norms by refusing platforms to ideologies that seek to abolish them—an apparent contradiction that remains a live debate in free-speech jurisprudence and platform moderation.
85 Democratic-Peace Paradox
Pairs of democracies rarely fight wars, yet democracies may engage in military interventions “for democracy” more often than autocracies do. The paradox questions whether democracy intrinsically promotes peace or merely shifts conflict types. Research now dissects regime transition instability, leader accountability, and audience-cost signalling to refine the democratic-peace thesis.
86 Icarus Paradox (Corporate Strategy)
A firm’s greatest strength—its core capability—can become a weakness if over-pursued. Success with a niche product leads to rigid culture and process ossification, causing failure when markets shift. The name recalls Icarus, whose wax wings melted as he flew too close to the sun. The paradox teaches corporate strategists to nurture dynamic capabilities and avoid over-exploiting yesterday’s formula.
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